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The Fregean theory of syntax says what the meaningful parts of 
sentences are, and which combinations of those parts are meaningful. 
The Fregean theory of meaning says how the meaningful parts of a 
meaningful expression contribute to that expression's sense and 
reference, The theory of syntax divides the meaningful parts of sen- 
tences into proper names (including sentences) and function ames. 
(See [3], w w 1-13; [8], w 1 .) Function ames are further distinguished 
according to numbers of argument positions and the syntactic type 
of expression appropriate to each position. A function name which 
takes in its argument places proper names is firstdevel; a function 
name which takes in its argument places first-level function ames is 
second-level. And so on. ([3], w w 21-23.) Every complex meaningful 
expression is the result of completing a function name with expres- 
sions of the appropriate types; and, conversely, every such comple- 
tion is a complex meaningful expression. ([2], w Since proper 
names and function ames are of different syntactic ategories, sub- 
stitution of one for the other in a meaningful expression will not in 
general preserve meaningfulness. It is also important o recognize 
that function names of different ypes are of different syntactic 
categories, and therefore substitution of a function ame for another 
of a different type will not preserve meaningfulness. ([3], pp. 73, 77; 
[41, p. 50.) 
Frege thinks of function names as having argument places or 
positions. These positions are marked by lower case Greek con- 
sonants he calls "gap holders". These gap holders erve several pur- 
poses. They indicate where the function ame is to be completed, 
where the completing expressions fit. They also specify the pattern 
of completion. For example, 
(1) ~ beat ~'s record 
is to be completed by idling both of its argument positions with the 
same expression, as in 
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(2) Eddy beat Eddy's record 
or in 
(3) Jacques beat Jacques's record. 
The predicate 
(4) ~ beat ~'s record, 
on the other hand, may be completed by ftlling the argument places 
differently, as in 
(5) Eddy beat Jacques's record. 
Another job the gap holders perform is marking the type of the com- 
pleting expression, thus displaying the syntactic category of the 
function name. Frege uses '~' and '~" to mark positions appropriate 
to proper names, and '~' and '~k' for positions appropriate to first- 
level function names. Gap holders are therefore an integral part of 
the theory of syntax for they both mark where other expressions 
can be inserted as well as the syntactic ategory of the function 
name. 
The Fregean theory of meaning assigns objects to proper names as 
senses and references, and functions to function ames. The reference 
of a complex expression is the value of the function which is the 
reference of the expression's main function name when it takes as 
arguments the references of the expressions which fill the main func- 
tion name's argument places. ([3], p. 34.) Analogously, the sense of 
a complex expression is a function of the senses of its parts. Sen- 
tences have truth values for references and thoughts for senses. 
Proper names and sentences are "complete" expressions, accord- 
ing to Frege, and their senses and references - viz., objects - are 
"complete," "saturated", not in need of completion". ([3], w 2.) 
The case is otherwise however for predicates, connectives, and quan- 
tifiers: they are "incomplete" expressions, and their senses and 
references are "unsaturated" and "in need of completion". ([3], w 1 ; 
[4], pp. 24, 31, 115.) Thus Frege says, 
The thought does not, by its make-up, stand in any need of 
completion; it is self-sufficient. Negation on the other hand 
needs to be completed by a thought. The two components,if 
we choose to employ this expression, are quite different in 
kind and contribute quite differently towards the formation of 
the whole. ([5], p. 49.) 
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Many commentators have worried about what such completeness 
and incompleteness might amount o. Max Black, for instance, has 
toyed with the idea that a function is an unfinished object ([1]). 
And William Marshall has sought o dispense with metaphor by say- 
ing that functions, "being perforated, bind the other parts together" 
([7], p. 255). My purpose is to offer a view of this, one which I 
hope will take some of the mystery out of Frege's work. 
There is, prima facie, a clear, literal sense in which function 
names can be said to be incomplete: they do, after all, contain gaps 
which are i'filed to form proper names. Now Dummett says that for 
Frege the incompleteness of an expression amounts to the fact that 
the expression 
does not consist merely of some sequence of words or symbols, 
but in the occurrence within sentences of such a sequence 
standing in a certain uniform relation to terms occurring in 
those sentences. ([2], p. 31) 
Thus (2) and (3) contain the same predicate (viz., (1)), while (5) 
contains a different predicate (namely, (4)0. Yet (5) has as much 
orthographic overlap with (2) and (3) as they have with each other. 
Dummett's point is that what predicate is involved epends not just 
on what words it contains, but also on the pattern of words filling 
its argument places; and "it is precisely in this sense," he claims, 
"that an expression is said by Frege to be 'incomplete'." 
Although there seems to be some truth in what Dummett says 
here, it does not appear that this could be Frege's whole point in 
calling a predicate "incomplete". For as Dummett himself notes, 
since for predicates with one argument position there is no question 
of the pattern of t'filing argument places, Frege should not - on 
Dummett's account - think of them as incomplete. Further, instead 
of using Greek consonants to mark the argument positions in a 
predicate, we might use indexed sets of parentheses. Thus we could 
say that (2) and (3) contain the predicate 
( )1 tieat( )a's'record 
while (5) contains the different predicate 
( )1 l~eat( )2'srecord. 
We could then leave in the parentheses in sentences - recasting (5) 
as '(Eddy)l beat (Jacques)2 's record' - thereby exhibiting the pat- 
tern of completion of the predicate. If we did this, then the predicate 
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would indeed "consist merely of some sequence of words or symbols" 
for now the gap holders would literally be present, even when the 
gaps were Idled. Such a change, it seems, would be a minor, ortho- 
graphic modification, and, one would think, nothing important to 
Frege's thought would be altered. But if Dummett is right, institut- 
ing this change would take from Frege every reason he had to think 
of predicates as "incomplete"; the incompleteness of predicates, that 
is, is on Dummett's view an orthographic accident. 
Such conclusions, I think, are farfetched. Even if he had used 
indexed parentheses for gap holders, it seems clear that Frege would 
have maintained the incompleteness of predicates. And attributions 
of incompleteness to one-place predicates by Frege is not mere 
sloppiness or laziness. Much of the point Frege is making here is the 
difference of predicates from proper names. They are of different 
syntactic ategories, and this Frege emphasizes in terms of complete- 
ness. Analogously, a function name with two argument positions is 
said to be "doubly incomplete", thus emphasizing its syntactic dif- 
ference from function names with only one argument position. And 
the incompletenesses of function names of different levels will be 
seen as different oo. So talk about he incompleteness of expressions 
is a way of talking about syntactic ategories. 
Frege believed that the thought expressed by a sentence is com- 
posed of parts which are analogs to the syntactic division of the 
sentence into parts (of. [5], p. 38). That is, corresponding to the 
division of words into syntactic ategories, Frege envisions adivision 
of senses (and references) into types. This parallel is necessary if the 
theory of syntax is to be consistent with the theories of sense and 
reference (cf. [8], w Consequently the distinctions of semantic 
categories are as important to the theory of meaning as the distinct ions 
ot syntactic ategories are to the syntax. 
Now just as Frege talks of the incompleteness of expressions to 
separate them into syntactic ategories, o too he talks of the un- 
saturatedness of functions to separate them into types. And he must 
make this second separation if his theories of syntax and meaning 
are to fit together. This is the principal goal of Frege's use of "in- 
complete" and "unsaturated": they provide a way of talking about 
categorial differences. Why, though, did Frege fix on the terminology 
he uses? His choice of language was probably influenced by what 
was for him the newly promising chemical theory, with its positive 
and negative radicals being "saturated" to form complete com- 
pounds. (Compare [4], p. x, note 2.) in an early unpublished manu- 
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script Frege makes this link, saying that functions and objects, as 
well as their names, are like 
the behavior of the atom: we suppose an atom never to be 
found on its own, but only combined with others, moving out 
of one combination only in order to enter immediately into 
another. A sign for a property never appears without a thing to 
which it might belong being at least indicated, a designation of 
a relation never without indication of the things which might 
stand in it. ([6], p. 17.) 
It seems clear that Peirce, apparently independently and almost 
simultaneously, used the same language as Frege under just this 
influence. Speaking of relation-words ("relatives"), Peirce says, 
A chemical atom is quite like a relative in having a definite 
number of loose ends or "unsaturated bonds", corresponding 
to the blanks of the relative. In a chemical molecule, each 
loose end of one atom is joined to a loose end, which it is 
assumed must belong to some other a tom. . .  Thus the chemi. 
cal molecule is . . .  like a complete proposition. ([9], 3.469; 
see too 3.421,3.475) 
This is obviously a very enticing analogy. (Peirce notes that the 
analogy quickly breaks down. "Yet," he says, "I cannot resist the 
temptation to pursue it.") For in assigning various "valencies" to 
chemical objects, the possibilities of lawful combination are defined: 
the objects are assigned types, or categories, and chemical laws are 
stated that specify, in terms of the categories, which combinations 
are possible. This is precisely the goal of a theory of syntax, and of a 
theory of meaning; only the objects being sorted out here are not 
chemical, but are syntactic or semantic. 
It may be said with some force that there is nothing inherently 
"incomplete" about a positive or negative radical. It is incomplete 
in just the sense that it is a proper part of larger molecules, and it is 
these molecules which are the naturally oceuring objects, not the 
radical; so, in its natural state the radical is a proper part of a larger 
compound. Much the same things are said by Frege for a function 
name, and for its sense. There need not be any inherent incomplete. 
ness with these: they are not unfinished objects. They are incomplete 
precisely in the sense that in their "natural states" they are proper 
parts of bigger compounds. Here we need to think of the naturally 
occurring objects as being sentential in nature: sentences, truth 
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values; thoughts. Frege is forced by what he sees as the syntactic 
parity of sentences and proper names into extending this a bit; thus 
we will really need to think of the naturally occurring objects as 
being not just sentential, but as either sentential or nominal. This 
extension is perhaps a place where the analogy begins to look thin, 
for proper names (or their senses) hardly seem to have as good a 
claim to natural occurrence as do sentences (or thoughts). But, in 
any event, the main point of the analogy remains the assignment of 
the meaningful entities of the theories of syntax and sense into sys- 
tems of non-overlapping categories, and the stating of laws that 
specify which combinations of which categories are possible. 
The chemical parallel is instructive. If all chemical compounds 
were formed by ionic bonds between charged particles, then it 
would be true that neutral atoms could not enter into combination 
with one another. Positive and negative radicals would be necessary 
for forming compounds and, in a picturesque moment, we might put 
this by saying that they were the glue of the compound, what held it 
together. But it is clear that there would be no point in trying to 
find some deep metaphysical sense to this; it is just a flamboyant 
way of describing the combinatorial facts. Similarly, every sentence 
must contain a function name, and this combinatorial fact might be 
put by saying that function names provide the glue for compound 
expressions. If we put the fact this way - as Frege does - we are 
being picturesque, not deeply metaphysical. 
Talk of degrees and kinds of incompleteness, then, is a way of 
delineating syntactic and semantic ategories in preparation for the 
statement of syntactic and semantic laws of meaningful combination 
in terms of those categories. It is a picturesque way of describing the 
situation suggested by the chemical parallel and the inclination to 
think of function names as containing holes. But it is mistaken to 
look behind the talk, past the combinatorial laws, for something 
that looks like glue or is what the function becomes when finished. 
INDIANA UNIVERSITY 
BLOOMINGTON, INDIANA 47401 
USA 
REFERENCES 
[ 1 ] Max Black, "Frege on Ftmclions", reprinted in Essays on Frege (Edited 
by E.D. Klemke; Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1968). 
252 
FREGEAN INCOMPLETENESS 
[2] Michael Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language (New York, Harper 
& Row, !973). 
[3] Gottlob Frege, The Basic Laws of Arithmetic (Edited and translated by 
Montgomery Furth; Berkeley, University of California Press, 1964). 
[4] Gottlob Frege, Translations from the Philosophical Writings (Edited 
and translated by P.T. Geach and Max Black; Oxford, Blackwell, 1966). 
[5] Gottlob Frege, Logical Investigations (Edited and translated by 
P.T. Geach and R.H. Stoothoff; New Haven, Yale University Press, 
1977). 
[6] Gottlob Frege, PosthumoUs Writings (Edited by Hermes, Kambattel, 
and Kaulbach; University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1979). 
[7] William Marshall, "Frege's Theory of Functions and Objects", reprinted 
in Essays on Frege (Edited by E.D. Klemke; Urbana, University of 
Illinois Press, 1968). 
[8] Edwin Martin, "Frege's Problems with 'The Concept Horse' ", Critica, 
VoL V, No. 15 (1971), 45-61. 
[9] Charles Sanders Peirce, The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 
VoL 3 (Edited by Charles Hartshome and Paul Weiss; Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press, 1931). References ate to paragraph numbers. 
253 
